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JUSTICE BRENNAN AND FEDERALISM 
Robert C. Post • 
Federalism is a chameleon-like concept whose appearance 
changes with the academic terrain. The concept clearly has some-
thing to do with the allocation of power between national and local 
governmental entities, but how this allocation is interpreted 
depends upon profession and discipline. Economists, for example, 
view federalism as an invitation to specify the most efficient possible 
arrangement of national and local power, whereas political 
scientists view federalism as a matter of generating descriptive and 
perhaps predictive models of these arrangements. For American 
constitutional lawyers and judges, however, federalism means some-
thing altogether different; it entails the articulation of constitutional 
values that specify how power ought to be allocated between federal 
and local governments. These values are incorporated into judicial 
decisionmaking. This essay is a study of the place of these values in 
the constitutional jurisprudence of Justice William J. Brennan Jr. 
When judges or lawyers speak of the value of federalism, they 
generally picture the national government and the states engaged in 
a tug-of-war for power. This struggle is seen as a zero-sum game, so 
that every allocation of power to the national government is viewed 
as a defeat for "federalism" and as a diminution of the prerogatives 
of the states. This picture of federalism emerged from epic battles 
over the reach of the federal commerce power, the "incorporation" 
of federal rights into the fourteenth amendment, and the extent of 
the jurisdiction and equitable powers of federal courts. These con-
troversies revolved around real and palpable tensions between the 
demands of a national and centralized authority and the preroga-
tives of local and decentralized state institutions. The tensions are 
aptly captured in the concept of state "sovereignty," the central 
concept underlying legal notions of federalism.! The concept 
• Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California, Berkeley. 
This essay was originally delivered at the Second Berkeley Seminar on Federalism in 1988. 
An earlier version of this essay appeared in FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW, AND 
POLICY (H. Scheiber ed. 1988) (Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at 
Berkeley). 
I. On the pervasive use of the concept of sovereignty in legal discussions of federalism, 
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assumes the existence of "exclusive domains of state authority,"2 so 
that every advance of national power can by definition occur only at 
the expense of state authority. 
I develop this image of federalism at some length, not merely 
because it is pervasive, but also because its acceptance makes Justice 
Brennan's views on federalism seem incoherent or unprincipled. 
The traditional legal understanding of federalism invites judges, in 
effect, to "choose up sides" between state and national authority. 
Justice Brennan has declined this invitation. If he is justly known 
as a champion of the powers of the federal judiciary vis-a-vis state 
judiciaries, he is equally well known as the author of one of the 
most cited law review articles in recent history urging state judges 
to base their decisions on state constitutional provisions so as to 
safeguard those decisions from interference by the federal judici-
ary.3 If he has been a strong supporter of federal legislative power, 
the author of a powerful dissent from the Court's recent and short-
lived effort to use principles of state sovereignty to limit that 
power,4 he has also attempted to exempt state legislative powers 
from the centralizing regulation of the dormant commerce clause,s 
and thus to leave to "the States the widest latitude to deal with the 
dynamics of social and economic change in seeking to satisfy their 
needs and further their progress."6 
Justice Brennan professes to be "a devout believer" in "our 
concept of federalism."' But the kind of federalism to which Bren-
nan holds allegiance is far from obvious. It is certainly not the kind 
of federalism that simply cedes more or less '"sovereignty" to the 
states. In fact the theses of this essay are that Brennan's philosophy 
of federalism cannot be understood except as an outgrowth of his 
concern for individual rights, and that only within the last fifteen 
years has his philosophy of federalism become a disciplined and 
forceful instrument of analysis. 
see Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 
1985 SuP. Cr. REv. 341, 346-59. 
2. /d. at 356. 
3. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REv. 489 (1977). Fred Shapiro has calculated that this article is the nineteenth most fre-
quently cited law review article of those published within the past forty years. Shapiro, The 
Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1540, 1550 (1985). 
4. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
5. Kassell v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
6. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 954 (1964). 
7. Brennan, supra note 3, at 502. 
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I 
A good place to begin a study of Justice Brennan's views of 
federalism is a speech he gave to the Conference of Chief Justices in 
New York on August 7, 1964. The talk was entitled "Some Aspects 
of Federalism,''s and it was clearly intended to mollify state judges 
who had been unsettled by recent decisions of the Warren Court. 
Brennan was of course one of the primary architects of that 
Court. The chief justices of the states saw before them the author of 
the landmark decision of New York Times v. Sullivan,9 which had 
been issued only five months earlier, and which for the first time 
extended the reach of federal constitutional control into state defa-
mation law. Only two months before, Brennan had delivered an 
opinion for the Court holding, against all precedent, that the fifth 
amendment's proscription of self-incrimination was incorporated 
into the fourteenth amendment, and hence could be asserted against 
the states. to In the same month the Court had decided Reynolds v. 
Sims,n which announced the revolutionary rule of "one man one 
vote," and which had been made possible by Brennan's epic 1961 
opinion in Baker v. Carr.u Baker itself had overruled over a cen-
tury of precedents and rendered disputes justiciable over legislative 
apportionment. And, of course, Brennan was probably best known 
to his audience as the author of Fay v. Noia, t3 the notorious decision 
which permitted use of federal habeas corpus to release a state pris-
oner because of constitutional errors in state processes, despite the 
presence of adequate state grounds to support the conviction. 
It is no wonder, then, that the chief justices of the states would, 
in the summer of 1964, be uneasy, and even hostile. Brennan began 
his speech by comparing himself to Daniel in the lion's den. He 
assured his audience, however, that he had once been, "after all, a 
state judge,''t4 and that he well understood the "functionally differ-
ent" roles of the federal and state judiciaries.ts But his purpose, 
Brennan said, would be to demonstrate that there "is no justifica-
8. Brennan, supra note 6, at 945 (1964). 
9. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
10. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964). Brennan would later proudly say of Malloy 
that it was the first time that "the Court finally decided a case by speaking in explicitly 
incorporationist terms." Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 543 (1986). 
II. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
13. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
14. Brennan, supra note 6, at 948. Brennan had been a New Jersey judge for seven 
years prior to his appointment to the United States Supreme Court in 1956. For four of those 
years he was an Associate Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
15. /d. at 949. 
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tion for the view that we are headed in opposite directions, and that 
the only legal bond between us is the subjugating one of the 
supremacy clause."I6 
At the outset of his talk Brennan invoked a familiar image of 
federalism, stating that "our federal structure necessarily" implied 
that some cases "will present a problem of reconciling state and 
federal authority."I7 The notion that federal and state authority 
were in conflict was no doubt at the root of the chief justices' anger. 
But Brennan tried to place this anger in historical perspective. 
"Controversies over constitutional limits upon state powers have 
been with us from our national beginnings," he observed, "we settle 
one only to have another emerge of different mien."Is This appeal 
to history, however, was but a prelude to Brennan's real point, 
which was that the modem controversies should not properly be 
considered issues of federalism at all. 
The modem problems of consistency of state action with the Constitution are 
of a different order from those of even twenty-five years ago. Now implicated are 
the various constitutional guarantees designed to protect individual freedom from 
repressive governmental action. Of course, the federal system's diffusion of govern-
mental power has the purpose of securing individual freedom. But this is not all the 
Constitution provides to secure that end. There are also explicit provisions to pre-
vent government, state or federal, from frustrating the great design. I do not think 
there can be any challenge to the proposition that the ultimate protection of individ-
ual freedom is found in court enforcement of these constitutional guarantees.19 
Brennan's message was startlingly blunt. Federalism, as a sys-
tem of decentralization designed to secure "individual freedom," 
was outmoded. The growth of government power after World War 
II had placed individuals at risk, and the danger could be averted 
only by judicial enforcement of civil rights. The issue was thus not 
one of state versus federal power, but rather of the power of govern-
ment, generically understood as state and federal government, ver-
sus the individual. Brennan attempted to use this reformulation as 
a bridge to reach out to his fellow judges. "You and I," he said in 
his eloquent conclusion, "are committed to the constitutional ideal 
of libertarian dignity protected through law." 
Crises at hand and in prospect are creating, and will create, more and more threats 
to the achievement of that ideal-more and more collisions of the individual with 
his government. The need for judicial vigilance in the service of that ideal was 
never greater. It has become the business of all of us to protect fundamental consti-
tutional rights threatened today in ways not possibly envisaged by the Framers.20 
16. /d. at 945. 
17. /d. at 947. 
18. /d. at 953. 
19. /d. at 954. 
20. /d. at 960. 
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Brennan's ultimate appeal was thus to the shared norms of a 
common professional role. His claim was that judges qua judges 
were concerned with individual rights, with the maintenance of 
"libertarian dignity protected through law," and hence that judges 
should be relatively indifferent to whether encroachments on that 
dignity emanated from state or federal governments. Brennan's ar-
gument rested upon the elaboration of a shared commitment to a 
professionalism that was so powerful as to overshadow competing 
loyalties to the autonomy of state institutions. Those loyalties, 
Brennan tried to demonstrate, were out-of-touch with modem reali-
ties, in which the "unity of the human family" was an increasingly 
tangible fact. "Our political, industrial, agricultural and cultural 
differences cannot stop the process which is making us a more 
united nation."2I 
Brennan's address was thus nothing less than a plea to aban-
don the traditional legal understanding of federalism. If at the be-
ginning of his talk Brennan had acknowledged the usual legal image 
of competition between federal and state governments, the acknowl-
edgement was only for the purpose of leading his audience to tran-
scend that image by coming to see that the real competition was 
instead between individuals and government, generically under-
stood. If in his talk Brennan had initially recognized the usual legal 
image of federalism as guarding the value of diversity, the recogni-
tion was only a prelude to his demonstration of the contemporary 
inadequacy of that value. If Brennan's audience understood feder-
alism to consist of loyalty to the tribal values of individual states, 
Brennan used his address to highlight instead their loyalty to their 
professional roles, roles which were of national scope and 
application. 
Brennan's address, in short, left no room for traditional feder-
alism as a source for principled or coherent constitutional values. It 
is thus no surprise that for the early Brennan, " 'considerations of 
comity and federalism' " would necessarily seem to be "vague con-
cepts" without "content."22 
The perspective set forth in Brennan's address was by no 
means merely strategic. It represented his deepest beliefs, at least as 
those beliefs can be measured by his judicial actions. Brennan's 
commitment to the expansion of individual rights needs no elabora-
tion. But two consequences of that commitment have particular 
relevance to a discussion of Brennan's views on federalism. 
First, Brennan's emphasis on individual rights accounts, I 
21. ld. at 960. 
22. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 548-49 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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think, for his almost religious belief in the importance of courts. 
"[T]he soul of a government of laws," Brennan has said, "is the 
judicial function, and that function can only exist if adjudication is 
understood by our people to be, as it is, the essentially disinterested, 
rational and deliberate element of our society. "23 Individual rights 
depend for their articulation and legal existence upon judicial 
processes, and hence to protect these rights Brennan has through-
out his career fought tenaciously to ensure access to courts.24 This 
theme runs throughout his opinions, and touches such disparate ar-
eas as justiciability ,2s standing,26 habeas corpus,21 federal equitable 
power,2s sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment,29 ab-
stention,3o and the interpretation of Section 1983.3• In all these ar-
eas Brennan has sought to use courts, primarily federal courts, to 
protect individual rights against both state and federal govern-
ments. He was an early and ardent supporter of the incorporation-
ist doctrine, through which he sought to impose the requirements of 
the Bill of Rights against the states.32 Conversely, he was a pioneer 
in the development of the constitutionally "implied cause of ac-
tion," which permitted federal officials to be sued for constitutional 
violations to the same extent as the states under Section 1983.33 
23. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in American Juris-
prudence, 40 Mo. L. REv. 390, 395 (1981). 
24. Indeed, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963), Brennan wrote that 
"[l]n the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private 
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all 
government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this coun-
try. It is thus a form of political expression . ... For such a group, association for litigation 
may be the most effective form of political association." (Emphasis added). 
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961). 
26. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
27. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 502 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Murray v. Carrier, 477 
U.S. 478, 516 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
28. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 
(1974); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Juidice v. 
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 341 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 
450 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
29. Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penhurst 
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
30. Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). 
31. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Quem v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 349 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
32. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Malloy v. Ho-
gan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
33. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
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Second, Brennan's sharp focus on individual rights and on 
courts as the instrumentalities for the assertion and protection of 
those rights, led him to a particular picture of the world, one in 
which individuals and governments confronted each other, with 
courts mediating between the two. Since in this picture govern-
ments do not assist the development of individuals but instead con-
strain them, Brennan was led to view individuals as essentially 
independent and autonomous and to understand the function of the 
judiciary as shielding this independence. There was thus little room 
in his philosophy for the notion that the identity and values of indi-
viduals could be molded and shaped by social groups. 
Parham v. J.R. ,34 for example, involved the due process rights 
of children who had been institutionalized in a mental hospital at 
the behest of their parents. The majority opinion, written by Chief 
Justice Burger, "reflected Western civilization concepts of the fam-
ily as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children."Js 
Brennan's separate opinion, however, rejected these concepts, as-
serting instead that "it ignores reality to assume blindly that parents 
act in their children's best interests when making commitment deci-
sions and when waiving their children's due process rights."36 For 
Brennan the children were to be understood as individuals, distinct 
from any social "unity" comprised by the family, and endowed with 
rights vis-a-vis the state that were unmediated by any group or or-
ganization. Brennan believed courts should protect these rights, de-
spite the danger that judicial intervention might itself cause further 
disintegration of the family. 
Parham is a representative example of the individualism that 
underlies Brennan's focus on courts and individual rights.37 This 
individualism had powerful implications for Brennan's vision of 
federalism. Felix Frankfurter, perhaps the most eloquent exponent 
of the values of federalism in the past fifty years, continually 
stressed that individual identity inheres in great measure in a "bind-
ing tie of cohesive sentiment,"Js that is created and nurtured by the 
"special relations between a State and its citizens."39 Just as it is an 
oversimplification to see a child only as a rights-bearing individual, 
because the child's identity is in part dependent upon its family, so 
34. 442 u.s. 584 (1979). 
35. /d. at 602. 
36. /d. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
~7. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Brennan has been quite sensitive to 
the corporate identity of religious institutions, and has striven to develop legal doctrines to 
protect that corporate identity. See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
426 u.s. 696 (1976). 
38. Minersville Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596 (1940). 
39. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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it was in Frankfurter's view an oversimplification to view citizens 
merely as rights-bearing individuals, because the identity of citizens 
is in part dependent upon the communities or states in which they 
live. Judicial action defending individual rights severs the "cohesive 
sentiment" that unites citizens to their states and local communi-
ties. From Frankfurter's perspective, therefore, Brennan's philoso-
phy of individualism systematically undercut the normative basis 
for federalism. 
For Brennan, on the other hand, the states were always gov-
ernments, rather than loci of community sentiments and identity. 
Hence the only purpose which Brennan could perceive in American 
federalism was the creation of a "federal structure" conducive to 
"securing individualliberty."40 It thus made no sense to Brennan 
to uphold state laws actually infringing upon that liberty; he could 
not accept the view that "the principle of federalism should be ac-
corded absolute supremacy at the sacrifice, in its name, of the indi-
vidual's constitutional protections."4I When in the 1970s the 
Burger Court made precisely such arguments, Brennan was aghast, 
accusing the Court of giving "a distorted and disturbing meaning" 
to "the great concept" of federalism:42 
Under the banner ofvague, undefined notions of equity, comity, and federalism, the 
Court has embarked upon the dangerous course of condoning both isolated ... and 
systematic . . . violations of civil liberties. Such decisions hardly bespeak a true 
concern for equity. Nor do they properly retlect the nature of our federalism. 
"Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual 
rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal 
judiciary. But in so doing it has forgotten that one of the strengths of our federal 
system is that it provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens. 
Federalism is not served when the federal half of that protection is crippled."43 
II 
Until the 1970s there was little or no occasion for Brennan to 
think seriously about the independent value of federalism. Federal-
ism was for him a matter of protecting individual rights, and these 
rights were to be defined and protected by national institutions. 
Deference to state institutions, or any of the other indicia of decen-
tralization ordinarily associated with federalism, thus had only mar-
ginal significance in Brennan's thinking. 
With the advent of the Burger Court, however, the Supreme 
40. Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 
UTAH L. REv. 423, 442 (1961). 
41. /d. at 426. 
42. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 346 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
43. !d. at 346-47 (quoting Brennan, supra note 3, at 502-03). 
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Court began increasingly to step back from an aggressive role in the 
protection of individual rights. The Court also moved toward a re-
affirmation of "Our Federalism," by which it meant "a proper re-
spect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire 
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a 
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare 
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 
separate functions in their separate ways."44 At root, "Our Feder-
alism" was a sign of the Court's refusal to follow the Warren 
Court's individualism to its logical conclusion. In conflicts between 
individual liberty and state institutions, the latter needn't always 
give way, in part because the value of federalism did not simply 
inhere in the furtherance of individual rights. 
The challenge of the Burger Court spurred Brennan to rethink 
his position about federalism. For the first time in 1977 he pro-
fessed himself to be "a devout believer" in "our concept of federal-
ism."4s Strikingly, however, the version of federalism to which he 
now gave his allegiance was entirely compatible with individualism. 
As such it is a unique and fascinating variant of American federalist 
thinking. To explicate it, I will examine a second text, Brennan's 
1986lecture on "The Bill of Rights and the States: The Renewal of 
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights."46 
Brennan began his talk with a defiant assertion. The Warren 
Court's most significant contribution to "the preservation and fur-
therance of the ideals we have fashioned for our society," he said, 
was neither Brown v. Board of Education nor the reapportionment 
decisions, but rather "the decisions binding the states to almost all 
of the restraints in the Bill of Rights."47 These decisions "reshaped 
the law of this land" by acknowledging that "it was vital to secure 
certain fundamental rights against state and federal governments 
alike."4s They exposed and destroyed the myth "that states could 
be trusted to nurture individual rights" because of "the assumption 
of 'an identity of interests between the states, as the level of gover-
ment closest to the people, and the primary corpus of civil rights 
and liberties of the people themselves.' "49 
Brennan thus staked out his methodological individualism and 
his rejection of any communitarian defense for federalism. States 
44. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
45. Brennan, supra note 3, at 502. 
46. Brennan, supra note 10, at 535. 
47. /d. at 536. 
48. /d. at 540. 
49. /d. at 537 (quoting from L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 1-3, at 5 
(1978)). 
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were not communities that were identified with their populations; 
they were instead governments which like all governments stood 
always in potential opposition to the rights of their own citizens. 
Hence Brennan applauded the "nationalization process" repre-
sented by the incorporationist decisions, not because of its national-
ism, but rather because it forced "modem constitutional law'' to 
revolve "around questions of civil and politicalliberty."so Nation-
alism was simply the medium through which constitutional law had 
come to its natural focus on individual rights. But how was this 
focus to be reconciled with the federalism to which Brennan now 
claimed allegiance? 
The answer was dramatically simple. Brennan had come to 
the realization that the Supreme Court's faltering protection of indi-
vidual rights was in fact inherent in its role as a "national court," 
which "must remain highly sensitive to concerns of state and local 
autonomy," and which must "represent the common denominator 
to allow for diversity and local experimentation."sl Hence the 
"Court's contraction of federal rights and remedies on grounds of 
federalism should be interpreted as a plain invitation to state courts 
to step into the breach."s2 Federalism must thus be considered as a 
structure creating a "double"s3 protection for individual rights, 
which should be safeguarded by both federal and state courts. The 
requirements of the fourteenth amendment represented only "a 
common national standard," but "our federalism permits state 
courts to provide greater protection to individual civil rights and 
liberties if they wish to do so."s4 "[S]tate experimentation may 
flourish in the space" above the "federal floor of protection" created 
by the fourteenth amendment, but "diversity" can be tolerated 
"only above and beyond this federal constitutional floor."ss For 
Brennan "this reconciliation of local autonomy and guaranteed in-
dividual rights is the only one consistent with our constitutional 
structure. "s6 
If in 1964 Brennan's commitment to individual rights led him 
to an unabashed nationalism and a celebration of national unity, by 
1986 he had altered his understanding of federalism sufficiently to 
entertain a respectable role for the values of diversity and local au-
tonomy. Diverse state protections for individual rights were to be 
50. Id at 545. 
51. /d. at 549. 
52. /d. at 548. 
53. /d. at 552. 
54. /d. at 551. 
55. /d. at 550. 
56. /d. 
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applauded. They were to be insulated from the interference of the 
federal judiciary, ironically enough, by the constitutional rule of 
"adequate state grounds," the very rule which Brennan had earlier 
sought to circumvent in such cases as Fay v. Noia s1 and Henry v. 
Mississipp;.ss The range of state diversity was strictly limited, how-
ever, in two ways: it must not violate minimum national norms, 
and it must be committed to the maintenance of individual rights. 59 
One is tempted to charge that Brennan's most recent version of 
federalism is simply the result of expediency. His is not a true vi-
sion of federalism, we might say, because it is only designed to 
achieve his pre-existing goal of maximizing the protection of indi-
vidual rights. Yet analysis of this charge reveals much about con-
temporary conceptions of federalism, for most of these conceptions 
have exactly the same character as Brennan's perspective: they use 
federalism as a means to achieve an ulterior goal. Those goals range 
from the diffusion of power, to the facilitation of diversity and ex-
perimentation, to the efficiency oflocal govemance.60 Brennan's vi-
sion of federalism differs from these only in the stark clarity of its 
formulation and in the strict logic with which Brennan tailors feder-
alist principles to the achievement of his chosen goal. But if we 
were seriously to view federalism, for example, as a system designed 
to achieve the value of efficient local administration, the federalist 
principles we would devise would have a similar "expedient" feel. 
The only vision of federalism that would not have such a "feel" 
is one that would embrace local government not as a means to an 
ulterior end, but for its own sake. Such a vision of federalism does 
57. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
58. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). Of course in Henry itself Brennan had been quite explicit that 
in applying the "principle" that "this Court will decline to review state court judgments 
which rest on independent and adequate state grounds," it was "important to distinguish 
between state substantive grounds and state procedural grounds." /d. at 446. This was be-
cause "[w]here the ground involved is substantive, the determination of the federal question 
cannot affect the disposition if the state court decision on the state law question is allowed to 
stand," whereas a "procedural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state 
courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right." 
/d. at 446-47. 
59. In turning to state courts for the protection of individual rights, Brennan was able 
to draw on a substantial and growing literature which assessed the theory and extent of the 
divergence of state and federal constitutional law. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 500 n.76 
(citing Faulk, The Supreme Coun of California 1971-1972. Foreword: The State Constitution: 
A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State 
Couns and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Coun, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); 
Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on 
the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975); Project Repon, Toward an 
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973)); Mosk, The 
State Couns in American Law: The Third Century 213 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976). 
60. See Scheiber, Federalism, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 
697, 699 (L. Levy & K. Karst eds. 1986). 
238 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:227 
of course exist. It stresses the values of local participation and cele-
brates the ability of small communities to foster a kind of gemein-
schaft that constitutes and embraces the identities of those who 
comprise them. This was the ultimate basis of Justice Frankfurter's 
commitment to federalism. It suggests that the debate between 
Brennan's and Frankfurter's perspectives on federalism is in some 
respects analogous to the contemporary debate between com-
munitarians and liberals.6t Whereas the former view the most val-
ued aspects of the self as stemming from its constitution by 
community life, the latter stress the importance of individual auton-
omy and independence. 
For Supreme Court Justices, however, the debate over federal-
ism is not merely academic; it is a matter of how to use the force of 
law to structure social relations. In part the resolution of this de-
bate depends upon the answers to empirical questions. We need to 
know, for example, whether the states in fact comprise communities 
such as those envisioned by Frankfurter. We need to assess there-
ality of local participation and whether the constitutional value of 
federalism actually assists its creation. We need to decide whether a 
better sociological description of contemporary realities is offered 
by the recent communitarian surge, reflected in the Court's renewed 
commitment to federalist values, or by Justice Brennan's alternative 
vision of a bureaucratic society divided between individuals and the 
state. 
But in the end, as with so many things, such empirical inquir-
ies may not be determinative; the answers no doubt lie somewhere 
in the middle. And that, of course, merely frames the usual unat-
tractive question for the law: should it throw its authority behind 
one sociological tendency or the other? To take Brennan's path 
may well exacerbate and accelerate the modern loss of community, 
but to adopt the perspective of modern communitarians may well 
risk sacrificing tangible individual rights at the altar of a speculative 
and nostalgic ideal. 
61. An overview of that debate may be found in Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of 
Liberalism, 14 PHIL &. PuB. AFF. 308 (1985); Thigpen&. Downing, Liberalism and the Com-
munity Critique, 31 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 637 (1987); Wallach, Liberals, Communitarians, and the 
Tasks of Political Theory, 15 POL THEORY 581 (1987). 
